Sparring Is Not a Fight

In “War as the Father of All Things?” we showed that it is not violence that brings forth the new but the inescapable emergency that forces the concentration of forces and quick solutions. This raises an awkward question: can a country that rearms in peacetime reach the speed of a country that rearms at war?

I. The fallacy

Ukraine develops its weapons under fire, and at a pace nobody in Germany would think possible. The hope here is: the threat is real for us too, and the money is now there. So things should move faster here as well.

The fallacy lies in the assumption that a threat acts like an emergency. A threat can be weighed, postponed and spread over budget years. An emergency cannot be dismissed. At the front it is renewed every day, by the opponent who learns back. President Zelensky described it in September 2025: the Russians change their attack drones every two to three months, and Ukraine changes its defences at the same rhythm. At the front, every innovation immediately meets someone who is seriously looking for its weakness. Every weakness becomes visible within days, and every delay costs lives.

In peacetime both are missing. The “opponent” in a trial is a colleague working to a test protocol. And a delay costs not lives but a deadline.

II. What the test at the front shows

Since July 2025 Ukraine has offered foreign companies the chance to test their products at the front. We described this in “The Trial of the Little Boys’ New Toys”. Does it bring results?

It brings awkward ones. The clearest example is the HX-2 attack drone of the Munich company Helsing. According to an internal Bundeswehr presentation reported by Bloomberg in January 2026, only about a quarter of the drones launched successfully in advanced tests. Jammers interrupted the link to the operators, and some units lacked promised AI components. Of the 4,000 predecessor HF-1 drones ordered, about half had been delivered, and of those 40 per cent were still in service. Ukraine held off on further orders. Helsing disputes the findings; the Ministry of Defence stated that the presentation had not been approved by its leadership.

So the front showed what the peacetime trials had not. But it only showed it. The learning has to happen in the company and in the procurement office, and they continue to work at peacetime pace. A test in war is not yet development at the pace of war.

III. Three attempts to simulate war

The first attempt is an opponent with combat experience in an exercise. In the NATO exercise “Hedgehog 2025” in Estonia, about ten Ukrainian drone pilots deployed more than 30 drones over less than ten square kilometres. In half a day they “destroyed” 17 armoured vehicles; two battalions were then judged no longer combat-effective. Ukrainian soldiers are now also training the Bundeswehr. This is the most effective way there is. But the hits are assumed, and an exercise teaches once, not continuously.

The second attempt is the realistic test range. In June 2026 the US Army announced training grounds meant to reproduce conditions in Ukraine, including electronic jamming. The reasoning is revealing: until now training has often taken place without jammers because the law restricts their use at home. Peace stands in the way of realistic testing with its own rules.

The third attempt is decreed pressure. With its “Replicator” programme the Pentagon wanted to field thousands of cheap AI drones by August 2025 and provided a billion dollars for it. According to the Wall Street Journal, the project stalled over technical flaws, high costs and bureaucracy. A deadline from above does not replace the opponent.

IV. Sparring and fighting

The difference resembles that between sparring and fighting. A sparring partner with real combat experience brings an enormous amount, as Hedgehog shows. But even the best sparring partner stops when you are on the floor. Three things are always missing in peacetime.

Missing is the opponent who adjusts to your solution. In an exercise he plays a role; at the front he looks for the weakness.

Missing is the willingness to deploy the unfinished. A drone that works only one time in four may still be used in war and improved in the process. In peacetime it fails acceptance testing, and the contract starts again from the beginning.

And missing is cheap mass. Ukraine’s speed also comes from the fact that many small manufacturers build cheap drones that can be lost. Germany buys expensive large systems. How little of that goes into research and how much flows abroad we showed in “Münchhausen’s Heirs”.

V. What remains

The fallacy runs: threat plus money equals Ukrainian speed. In fact it equals German pace at higher prices.

That things can move fast in peacetime nonetheless was shown by the pandemic. There the emergency was inescapable: a clear goal, damage visible every day, and authorities that therefore deliberately reduced their friction. Such an emergency cannot be simulated; it can only be lived through or recognised. Perhaps that is even a good sign. A country that could fully simulate war would first have had to stop living in peace.

Back to the essay: War as the Father of All Things? · Further reading: Münchhausen’s Heirs · The Trial of the Little Boys’ New Toys