Transparency Council: Profiles of European Leading Politicians

Tenth Federal Chancellor of Germany. Coalition CDU/CSU–SPD. Elected with 47.7% in his direct constituency of Hochsauerlandkreis at the 2025 federal election. CDU party chairman since 2022, confirmed with 91.2% at the party conference in February 2026.

Economic-liberal conservative. Priorities: deregulation, competitiveness, reduction of the welfare state in favour of private provision, strong NATO alignment, Ukraine support. Critical of EU regulation — demands, together with Macron and Meloni, an end to the Green Deal as a priority EU policy in favour of competitiveness.

Suspension of the debt brake for defence spending and a €500 billion special fund for infrastructure — before the new government was formed, with the old Bundestag, which was constitutionally contested. Defence budget 2026: €108 billion, planned to reach €152 billion by 2029. Ukraine military aid 2026: €11.5 billion. EU-Mercosur agreement concluded in January 2026 after 25 years of negotiations — with Meloni as the decisive vote, not Macron, who blocked it.

In 2005 Merz sued against the obligation to disclose secondary income as a Bundestag member — and lost. In 2006 he earned an estimated €250,000 from secondary activities alongside his parliamentary mandate. In March 2021 he declared that upon re-entering the Bundestag he would not pursue paid secondary activities — which he kept, but explicitly excluding his vice-president role in the CDU Wirtschaftsrat. In an interview with Die Zeit he claimed he had "never accepted a lobbying mandate" for BlackRock — which is difficult to reconcile with his documented job description, which explicitly included maintaining contacts with government representatives. As late as 20 March 2020 he spoke on behalf of BlackRock with Finance State Secretary Jörg Kukies about "current financial market questions".

From March 2016 to March 2020 Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the German subsidiary of BlackRock, the world's largest asset manager. Annual salary according to reports: around €125,000. In this role, lobbying appointments with Ministers Scholz (Finance) and Gabriel (Foreign Affairs) and State Secretary Kukies are documented. Private wealth estimated at around €12 million. Former supervisory board roles at Commerzbank, AXA, Deutsche Börse, HSBC Trinkaus (the latter in connection with cum-ex), IVG and others. Digital Minister Karsten Wildberger is Vice-President of the CDU Wirtschaftsrat — a party-affiliated lobbying association whose members include companies such as BASF, BMW and Rheinmetall. The deregulation policy of the Merz government and plans for privatisation of pension provision correspond directly to BlackRock's published strategic agenda for the European market.

What precisely was discussed in the BlackRock lobbying appointments 2016–2020? This is not fully public. How great is the actual influence of the CDU Wirtschaftsrat on government decisions? Not fully transparent. Germany has inadequate integrity rules for government members according to GRECO evaluation — an ethics commission has been established; its effectiveness is not yet assessable.

Second term until 2027, after which he constitutionally cannot stand again. The snap election decision in June 2024 severely damaged his domestic political capacity: the National Assembly has since been fragmented; Macron has been governing without a stable parliamentary majority.

Began as economic-liberal and socially reform-oriented. Has developed over the years into one of the most determined advocates of European strategic autonomy. In the Trump confrontation of 2025/26 in the camp of the "sovereignty hawks" — against capitulation to US trade pressure, for activation of the EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument. On Ukraine: consistently pro-Ukraine, including the option of deploying own troops. Domestically: politically weakened after the snap election and, by his own assessment, become a lame duck.

Snap election June 2024 — one of the most consequential miscalculations by a European head of state in recent years: it massively strengthened Le Pen's RN, weakened Macron's reform capacity for the rest of his term, and paralysed France's role as European counterweight to Germany at decisive moments. Macron was the main blocker on EU-Mercosur — a position described as "increasingly irrational" that ultimately isolated France while Meloni signed the agreement. In the Trump trade confrontation of 2025: one of the few voices for determined European countermeasures.

Macron has repeatedly demanded European sovereignty and strategic autonomy — while simultaneously concluding bilateral French cloud deals (Bleu with Microsoft, S3NS with Google) that legal experts assess as not delivering genuine sovereignty, because the parent companies are subject to the US CLOUD Act. The public rhetoric of independence and the private-sector practice of entanglement stand in a tension that has not been resolved. Macron's public calls for extension of a European nuclear umbrella have never been followed by concrete content on what such an umbrella would mean.

Before his political career Macron was an investment banker at Rothschild & Cie. — a background that is repeatedly invoked in France as an explanatory frame for economic-policy decisions. No formal conflicts of interest in the legal sense are currently documented, as the office of President of the Republic in France is subject to a strict incompatibility principle.

What exactly does Macron plan for after 2027? His activities suggest an international role — but in what form? How consistent is his positioning as defender of European sovereignty given the bilateral cloud deals with US providers? And: can France play a leading European role without domestic political stability?

Won the July 2024 parliamentary election with a historic landslide — Labour won 412 of 650 seats, despite a vote share of only 33.7%. The first-past-the-post system produced a massive parliamentary majority from a moderate vote share. Prime Minister since 5 July 2024. Former Director of Public Prosecutions (2008–2013), human rights lawyer, knight (Sir Keir Starmer).

Has shifted Labour strongly to the centre — which enabled his election but fragmented his base. Foreign policy: transatlantically oriented, pro-NATO, pro-Ukraine, seeking rapprochement with the EU without formal re-joining. In the Trump confrontation initially in the "appeaser" camp — Starmer was one of the first European leaders to visit Trump at the White House after his second inauguration. In the 2025 trade confrontation, alongside Merz in the capitulation camp on US tariffs.

Rapid rapprochement with Trump despite the latter's anti-democratic tendencies — which was difficult to explain to the Labour base and progressive voters. Participation in the "Coalition of the Willing" for Ukraine. UK-EU renegotiations are ongoing without a clear course being visible: no rejoining, no stable new framework. Budget October 2024: tax increases for businesses and the wealthy, simultaneous cuts to social benefits — both politically painful at the same time, both necessary after years of Conservative fiscal management.

As Labour leader before the election Starmer formulated ten "Pledges", several of which he has revised or quietly abandoned since — including abolition of tuition fees and a more ambitious wealth tax. The tension between campaign rhetoric and governing practice is documented. His earlier role as Director of Public Prosecutions and his decisions not to pursue certain police operations are criticised by civil rights lawyers.

Starmer received gifts and benefits in kind worth over £100,000 as party leader — including clothing, glasses, travel and hospitality from various donors. This was legal but generated considerable public criticism, particularly given his rhetoric on political integrity. No documented conflict of interest in the narrower sense — Starmer is not a former lobbyist or corporate representative.

What will the long-term UK-EU relationship look like? Starmer has expressed no position for or against later rejoining. What is Starmer's actual foreign policy doctrine — is the Trump proximity a tactical manoeuvre or a strategic positioning? And: can Labour hold its base if social policy concessions to the centre are made at the expense of austerity measures?

Second term as Commission President until 2029. First woman in this role. Previously Federal Minister of Defence (2013–2019) in Germany — a term associated with significant procurement scandals and consultancy affairs.

Centrist, technocratic, tactically flexible. Implemented the Green Deal as the flagship project of her first term — and effectively relativised it in the second term under pressure from Merz, Macron and Meloni in favour of competitiveness. In the Trump confrontation: in the middle ground between appeasement and resistance. Refused to activate the Anti-Coercion Instrument; spoke of "dialogue and solutions" while others struck harder tones. Negotiated the surrender agreement with Trump in July 2025 in Scotland — abandoning significant European positions.

EU-US trade agreement July 2025: negotiated under pressure from the Trump tariff regime, described by critical voices as capitulation. The decision not to activate the Anti-Coercion Instrument despite clear US coercive attempts is documented and contested. Chips Act, AI Act, Digital Markets Act, Net Zero Industry Act — an impressive regulatory agenda whose effectiveness remains to be assessed.

Von der Leyen never enabled full clarification in the consultancy affair as Defence Minister (McKinsey and other external consultancies received massively increased contracts under her without proper tendering). The parliamentary investigation committee worked with incomplete documents, as files had been destroyed. In the Pfizergate affair: von der Leyen conducted personal SMS negotiations with Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla on EU vaccine contracts worth billions. The SMS were never disclosed — the Commission argued they were deleted or untraceable. An EU Ombudsperson found maladministration. No verdict exists; the question remains open.

The personal negotiations with Pfizer without inclusion of the normal procurement procedure and without documented written correspondence constitute the essential unresolved problem. The EU Ombudsperson found failure of administrative governance. Von der Leyen denies wrongdoing. The complete factual situation is not publicly accessible.

What was in the Pfizer SMS? This question remains unanswered. How consistent is von der Leyen's commitment to European sovereignty when the Commission systematically refrains from using the Anti-Coercion Instrument? And: what role does the Commission President play in an EU whose real power increasingly sits in the national capitals — with Merz, Macron, Meloni?

First woman to serve as head of government in Italy. Coalition with Lega and Forza Italia. Fratelli d'Italia is the successor party of the post-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano — which shapes the historical classification of her party without automatically defining her current positions. Meloni has visibly distanced herself from more radical positions held during the opposition phase and positioned herself as European pragmatist.

National-conservative, "God, Homeland, Family" as explicit trias. Foreign policy: surprisingly pro-NATO and pro-Ukraine — contrary to expectations of many observers at her election. Within the EU: tactically flexible, not fundamentally anti-European. Signed the EU-Mercosur agreement in January 2026 when Macron blocked — positioning her as the decisive voice for the agreement and increasing her political capital in Brussels. In the Trump confrontation: initially in the "appeaser" camp, which retrospective analysis assessed as incorrect — strength, not servility, is what caused Trump's partial retreat.

Ukraine support despite coalition partners (Lega/Salvini) with recognisably pro-Russian history. EU-Mercosur: decisive yes vote that enabled the agreement blocked for 25 years. Domestically: budget conflicts with the EU Commission over Italy's state deficit; press freedom concerns (RAI restructuring); LGBTQ+ rights restrictions documented.

Before the election Meloni held EU-sceptical and anti-Euro positions — after the election she pursues a pragmatically EU-conformant policy. This is interpretable as adaptation to reality, but also as a discrepancy between campaign and governing. Her party Fratelli d'Italia contains members and currents with fascist tradition — Meloni has distanced herself from explicit fascism without the party having fully processed its history.

No documented conflicts of interest in the narrower sense from former corporate activities. Her party receives partial corporate funding, which is covered by normal Italian party finance law. The close connection to the Murdoch press and to right-national international networks is documented, but is not a conflict of interest in the legal sense.

Is Meloni's European pragmatism stable or tactically conditioned? Her party and coalition partners have recognisably different instincts. What happens to the domestic agenda — press freedom, minority rights — under less foreign-policy pressure? And: how long can Meloni hold the coalition with Salvini's Lega when foreign-policy questions (Ukraine, EU) are fundamentally contested within the coalition?